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Abstract
This article develops a model which shows that bank deposit contracts can provide
allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how
banks subject to runs can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks
which lead to a demand for liquidity. Traditional demand deposit contracts which
provide liquidity have multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs
in the model cause real economic damage, rather than simply reﬂecting other
problems. Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis shows
that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can
produce superior contracts.
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The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.This article develops a model which shows that bank deposit
contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange
markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs
can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks
which lead to a demand for liquidity. Traditional demand de-
posit contracts which provide liquidity have multiple equilibria,
one of which is a bank run. Bank runs in the model cause real
economic damage, rather than simply reﬂecting other problems.
Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis
shows that there are circumstances when government provision
of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.
Bank runs are a common feature of the extreme crises that
have played a prominent role in monetary history. During
a bank run, depositors rush to withdraw their deposits be-
cause they expect the bank to fail. In fact, the sudden with-
drawals can force the bank to liquidate many of its assets
at a loss and to fail. During a panic with many bank fail-
ures, there is a disruption of the monetary system and a re-
duction in production.
Institutions in place since the Great Depression have
successfullypreventedbankrunsintheUnitedStatessince
the 1930s. Nonetheless, current deregulation and the dire
ﬁnancial condition of savings and loan associations make
bank runs and institutions to prevent them a current policy
issue, as shown by recent aborted runs.
1 (Internationally,
Eurodollar deposits tend to be uninsured and are therefore
subject to runs, and this is true in the United States as well
for deposits above the insured amount.) It is good that de-
regulationwillleavebankingmorecompetitive,butpolicy-
makers must ensure that banks will not be left vulnerable
to runs.
Throughcarefuldescriptionandanalysis,Friedmanand
Schwartz (1963) provide substantial insight into the prop-
erties of past bank runs in the United States. Existing the-
oretical analysis has neglected to explain why bank con-
tracts are less stable than other types of ﬁnancial contracts
or to investigate the strategic decisions that depositors
face. The model we present has an explicit economic role
for banks to perform: the transformation of illiquid claims
(bank assets) into liquid claims (demand deposits). The
analyses of Patinkin (1965, chap. 5), Tobin (1965), and
Niehans (1978) provide insights into characterizing the
liquidity of assets. This article gives the ﬁrst explicit analy-
sis of the demand for liquidity and the transformation
serviceprovidedbybanks.Uninsureddemanddepositcon-
tracts are able to provide liquidity, but leave banks vulner-
able to runs. This vulnerability occurs because there are
multiple equilibria with differing levels of conﬁdence.
Our model demonstrates three important points. First,
banks issuing demand deposits can improve on a com-
petitive market by providing better risk-sharing among
people who need to consume at different random times.
Second, the demand deposit contract providing this im-
provement has an undesirable equilibrium (a bank run) in
which all depositors panic and withdraw immediately, in-
cluding even those who would prefer to leave their depos-
its in if they were not concerned about the bank failing.
Third, bank runs cause real economic problems because
even healthy banks can fail, causing the recall of loans
and the termination of productive investment. In addition,
our model provides a suitable framework for analysis of
the devices traditionally used to stop or prevent bank runs,
namely, suspension of convertibility and demand deposit
insurance (which works similarly to a central bank serving
as lender of last resort).
The illiquidity of assets enters our model through the
economy’s riskless production activity. The technology
provides low levels of output per unit of input if operated
for a single period, but high levels of output if operated for
two periods. The analysis would be the same if the asset
were illiquid because of selling costs: one receives a low
return if unexpectedly forced to liquidate early. In fact, this
illiquidity is a property of the ﬁnancial assets in the econ-
omy in ourmodel, eventhough they aretraded incompeti-
tive markets with no transaction costs. Agents will be con-
cerned about the cost of being forced into early liquidation
of these assets and will write contracts which reﬂect this
cost. Investors face private risks which are not directly in-
surable because they are not publicly veriﬁable. Under op-
timalrisk-sharing,this privateriskimpliesthat agentshave
different time patterns of return in different private infor-
mation states and that agents want to allocate wealth un-
equally across private information states. Because only the
agent ever observes the private information state, it is im-
possible to write insurance contracts in which the payoff
dependsdirectlyon privateinformationwithout anexplicit
mechanism for information ﬂow. Therefore, simple com-
petitive markets cannot provide this liquidity insurance.
Banks are able to transform illiquid assets by offering
liabilities with a different, smoother pattern of returns over
time than the illiquid assets offer. These contracts have
multiple equilibria. If conﬁdence is maintained, there can
be efficient risk-sharing, because in that equilibrium a
withdrawal will indicate that a depositor should withdraw
under optimal risk-sharing. If agents panic, there is a bank
run and incentives are distorted. In that equilibrium, every-
one rushes in to withdraw their deposits before the bank
gives out all of its assets. The bank must liquidate all its
assets, even if not all depositors withdraw, because liqui-
dated assets are sold at a loss.
Illiquidity of assets provides the rationale both for the
existence of banks and for their vulnerability to runs. An
important property of our model of banks and bank runs
is that runs are costly and reduce social welfare by in-
terrupting production (when loans are called) and by de-
stroying optimal risk-sharing among depositors. Runs in
many banks would cause economywide economic prob-
lems. This is consistent with the Friedman and Schwartz
(1963) observation of large costs imposed on the U.S.
economy by the bank runs in the 1930s, although Fried-
man and Schwartz assert that the real damage from bank
runs occurred through the money supply.
Another contrast with our view of how bank runs do
economic damage is discussed by Fisher (1911, p. 64) and
Bryant (1980). In this view, a run occurs because the
bank’s assets, which are liquid but risky, no longer cover
the nominally ﬁxed liability (demand deposits), so deposi-
tors withdraw quickly to cut their losses. The real losses
are indirect, through the loss of collateral caused by falling
prices. In contrast, a bank run in our model is caused by a
shift in expectations, which could depend on almost any-
thing,consistentwiththeapparentlyirrationalobservedbe-
havior of people running on banks.
We analyze bank contracts that can prevent runs and
examine their optimality. We show that there is a feasiblecontract that allows banks both to prevent runs and to pro-
videoptimalrisk-sharing byconvertingilliquidassets.The
contract corresponds to suspension of convertibility of de-
posits(tocurrency),aweaponbankshavehistoricallyused
against runs. Under other conditions, the best contract that
banks can offer (roughly, the suspension-of-convertibility
contract) does not achieve optimal risk-sharing. However,
inthismoregeneralcase,thereisacontractwhichachieves
the unconstrained optimum when government deposit in-
surance is available. Deposit insurance is shown to be able
to rule out runs without reducing the ability of banks to
transform assets. What is crucial is that deposit insurance
frees the asset liquidationpolicy from strict dependence on
the volume of withdrawals. Other institutions such as the
discount window (the government acting as lender of last
resort) can serve a similar function; however, we do not
model this here. The taxation authority of the government
makes it a natural provider of the insurance, although there
may be a competitive fringe of private insurance.
Government deposit insurance can improve on the best
allocations that private markets provide. Most of the exist-
ing literature on deposit insurance assumes away any real
service from deposit insurance, concentrating instead on
the question of pricing the insurance, taking as given the
likelihood of failure. (See, for example, Merton 1977,
1978; Kareken and Wallace 1978; Dothan and Williams
1980.)
Our results have far-reaching policy implications, be-
cause they imply that the real damage from bank runs is
primarily from the direct damage occurring when produc-
tion is interrupted by the recalling of loans. This implies
that much of the economic damage in the Great Depres-
sion was caused directly by bank runs. A study by Ber-
nanke (1983) supports our thesis; it shows that the number
of bank runs is a better predictor of economic distress than
the money supply.
The Bank’s Role in Providing Liquidity
Banks have issued demand deposits throughout their his-
tory, and economists have long had the intuition that de-
mand deposits are a vehicle through which banks fulﬁll
their role of turning illiquid claims into liquid claims. In
this role, banks can be viewed as providing insurance that
allows agents to consume when they need to most. Our
simple model shows that asymmetric information lies at
the root of liquidity demand, a point not explicitly noted
in the previous literature.
The model has three periods (T = 0, 1, 2) and a single
homogeneous good. The productive technology yields R>
1 units of output in period 2 for each unit of input in period
0.Ifproductionisinterruptedinperiod1,thesalvagevalue
isjusttheinitialinvestment.Therefore,theproductivetech-
nology is represented by









where the choice between (0, R) and (1, 0) is made in pe-
riod 1. (Of course, constant returns to scale imply that a
fraction can be done in each option.)
One interpretation of the technology is that long-term
capital investments are somewhat irreversible, which ap-
pearstobeareasonablecharacterization.Theresultswould
be reinforced (or can be alternatively motivated) by any
type of transaction cost associated with selling a bank’s
assets before maturity. See Diamond 1984 for a model of
the costly monitoring of loan contracts by banks, which
implies such a cost.
All consumers are identical as of period 0. Each faces
a privately observed, uninsurable risk of being of type 1 or
of type 2. In period 1, each agent’s type is determined and
revealed privately to the agent. Type 1 agents care only
aboutconsumptioninperiod1,andtype2 agentscareonly
about consumption in period 2. In addition, all agents can
privately store (or hoard) consumption goods at no cost.
This storage is not publicly observable. No one would
store between T = 0 and T = 1, because the productive
technologydoes atleastas well(andbetterif helduntilT =
2). If an agent of type 2 obtains consumption goods at T =
1, this agent will store them until T = 2 to consume them.
Let cT represent goods received (to store or consume) by
an agent at period T. The privately observed consumption
at T = 2 of a type 2 agent is then what the agent stores
from T = 1 plus what the agent obtains at T =2 ,o rc1 +c2.
In terms of this publicly observed variable cT, the discus-
sion above implies that each agent j has a state-dependent
utility function (with the state private information), which
we assume has the form






u(c1)i f j is of type 1 in state θ
ρu(c1+c2)i f j is of type 2 in state θ
where 1 ≥ρ> R
−1 and u:R++ → R is twice continuously
differentiable,increasing, andstrictly concaveandsatisﬁes
Inada conditions u′(0) = ∞ and u′(∞) = 0. Also, we as-
sume that the relative risk-aversion coefficient −cu″(c)÷
u′(c) > 1 everywhere. Agents maximize expected utility,
E[u(c1, c2; θ)], conditional on their information (if any).
A fraction t ∈ (0, 1) of the continuum of agents are of
type 1, and conditional on t, each agent has an equal and
independent chance of being of type 1. Later sections will
allow t to be random (in which case, at period 1, consum-
ers know their own types but not t), but for now we take
t to be constant.
To complete the model, we give each consumer an en-
dowment of one unit in period 0 (and none at other
times). We consider ﬁrst the competitive solution where
agents hold the assets directly, and in each period there is
a competitive market in claims on future goods. Constant
returns to scale imply that prices are determined: the
period 0 price of period 1 consumption is one, and the
period 0 and period 1 prices of period 2 consumption are
R
−1. This is because agents can write only uncontingent
contracts, since there is no public information on which to
condition. Contracting in period T = 0, all agents (who are
then identical) will establish the same trades and will in-
vest their endowments in the production technology. Giv-
en this identical position of each agent at T = 0, there will
be trade in claims on goods for consumption at T = 1 and
at T = 2. Each has access to the same technology, and
each can choose any positive linear combination of c1 =1 and c2 = R. Each agent’s production set is proportional
to the aggregate set, and for there to be positive produc-
tion of both c1 and c2, the period T = 1 price of c2 must
be R
−1. Given these prices, there is never any trade, and
agents can do no better or worse than if they produced on-
ly for their own consumption. Let c
i
k be consumption in







1 =0 ,a n dc
2
2 = R, since type 1s
always interrupt production but type 2s never do.
By comparison, if types were publicly observable as of
period 1, it would be possible to write optimal insurance
contracts that give the ex ante (as of period 0) optimal





























(which is the resource constraint). By assumption, ρR >1 ,
andsincerelativeriskaversionalwaysexceedsunity,equa-








2 Therefore, there is room for
improvement on the competitive outcome (c
1
1 = 1 and c
2
2 =






* by equation (4), since ρR >1 .
The optimal insurance contract just described would al-
low agents to insure against the unlucky outcome of being
a type 1 agent. This contract is not available in the simple
contingent-claims market. Also, the lack of observability
of agents’ types rules out a complete market of Arrow-
Debreustate-contingentclaims,becausethismarketwould
require claims that depend on the nonveriﬁable private in-
formation. Fortunately, it is potentially possible to achieve
the optimal insurance contract, since the optimal contract
satisﬁestheself-selectionconstraints.
3Wearguethatbanks
can provide this insurance: by providing liquidity, banks
guarantee a reasonable return when the investor cashes in
before maturity, as is required for optimal risk-sharing. To
illustrate how banks provide this insurance, we ﬁrst exam-
ine the traditional demand deposit contract, which is of
particular interest because of its ubiquitous use by banks.
Studying the demand deposit contract in our framework
also indicates why banks are susceptible to runs.
In our model, the demand deposit contract gives each
agent withdrawing in period 1 a ﬁxed claim of r1 per unit
deposited in period 0. Withdrawal tenders are served se-
quentially in random order until the bank runs out of as-
sets. This approach allows us to capture the ﬂavor of con-
tinuous time (in which depositors deposit and withdraw at
different random times) in a discrete model. Note that the
demand deposit contract satisﬁes a sequential service con-
straint, which speciﬁes that a bank’s payoff to any agent
can depend only on the agent’s place in line and not on
future information about agents later in line.
We are assuming throughout this article that the bank
is mutually owned (a mutual) and liquidated in period 2,
so that agents not withdrawing in period 1 get a pro rata
share of the bank’s assets in period 2. Let V1 be the period
1 payoff per unit of deposit withdrawn, which depends on
one’s place in line at T = 1, and let V2 be the period 2
payoff per unit of deposit not withdrawn at T = 2, which







r1 if fj < r
−1
1




(7) V2(f, r1) = max{R(1−r1f)/(1−f), 0}
where fj is the quantity of withdrawers’ deposits serviced
before agent j and f is the total quantity of demand depos-
its withdrawn, both as fractions of total demand deposits.
Let wjbe the fraction of agent j’s deposits that the agent at-
tempts to withdraw at T = 1. The consumption from de-
posit proceeds, per unit of deposit of a type 1 agent, is thus
given by wjV1(fj,r 1), while the total consumption from de-
posit proceeds, per unit of deposit of a type 2 agent, is giv-
en by wjV1(fj,r 1)+( 1 −wj)V2(f, r1).
Equilibrium Decisions
The demand deposit contract can achieve the full-informa-
tion optimal risk-sharing as an equilibrium. (By equilibri-
um, we will always refer to pure strategy Nash equilibri-
um
4—and for now we will assume that all agents are




that is, when the ﬁxed payment per dollar of deposits with-
drawn at T = 1 is equal to the optimal consumption of a
type 1 agent given full information. If this contract is in
place, it is an equilibrium for type 1 agents to withdraw at




Another equilibrium (a bank run) has all agents panick-
ing and trying to withdraw their deposits at T = 1: if this
is anticipated, all agents will prefer to withdraw at T =1 .
This is because the face value of deposits is larger than
the liquidation value of the bank’s assets.
It is precisely the transformation of illiquid claims into
liquid claims that is responsible both for the liquidity
service provided by banks and for their susceptibility to
runs. For all r1 > 1, runs are an equilibrium.
6 If r1 =1 ,a
bank would not be susceptible to runs because V1(fj, 1) <
V2(f, 1) for all values of 0 ≤ fj ≤ f, but if r1 = 1, the bank
simply mimics direct holding of the assets, and the bank is
therefore no improvement on simple competitive-claims
markets. A demand deposit contract which is not subject
to runs provides no liquidity services.
The bank run equilibrium provides allocations that are
worseforallagentsthantheywouldhaveobtainedwithout
the bank (trading in the competitive-claims market). In the
bank run equilibrium, everyone receives a risky return that
has a mean of one. Holding assets directly provides a risk-
less return that is at least one (and equal to R >1i fa n
agent becomes a type 2). Bank runs ruin the risk-sharing
between agents and take a toll on the efficiency of produc-
tion because all production is interrupted at T = 1, when it
is optimal for some to continue until T =2 .
If we take the position that outcomes must match an-
ticipations, the inferiority of bank runs seems to rule outobserved runs, since no one would deposit anticipating a
run. However, agents will choose to deposit at least some
of their wealth in the bank even if they anticipate a posi-
tive probability of a run, provided that the probability is
small enough, because the good equilibrium dominates
holding assets directly. This could happen if the selection
between the bank run equilibrium and the good equilibri-
um depended on some commonly observed random vari-
able in the economy. This could be a bad earnings report,
a commonly observed run at some other bank, a negative
government forecast, or even sunspots. (Analysis of this
point in a general setting is given in Azariadis 1981 and
Cass andShell 1983.) Theobserved variableneed not con-
vey anything fundamental about the bank’s condition. The
problem is that once agents have deposited, anything that
causes them to anticipate a run will lead to a run. This im-
pliesthatbankswithpuredemanddepositcontractswillbe
veryconcernedaboutmaintainingconﬁdencebecausethey
realize that the good equilibrium is very fragile.
The pure demand deposit contract is feasible, and we
have seen that it can attract deposits even if the perceived
probability of a run is positive. This explains why the con-
tract has actually been used by banks in spite of the dan-
ger of runs. Next, we examine a closely related contract
that can help to eliminate the problem of runs.
Improving on Demand Deposits:
Suspension of Convertibility
The pure demand deposit contract has a good equilibrium
that achieves the full-information optimum when t is not
stochastic. However, in its bank run equilibrium, the pure
demand deposit contract is worse than direct ownership of
assets. It is illuminating to begin the analysis of optimal
bankcontractsbydemonstratingthatthereisasimplevari-
ation on the demand deposit contract which gives banks a
defenseagainstruns:suspensionofallowingwithdrawalof
deposits, referred to as suspension of convertibility (of de-
posits to cash). Our results are consistent with the claim by
FriedmanandSchwartz(1963)thatinthe1930s,thenewly
organized Federal Reserve Board may have made runs
worsebypreventingbanksfromsuspendingconvertibility:
the total week-long banking “holiday” that followed was
more severe than any of the previous suspensions.
If banks can suspend convertibility when withdrawals
are too numerous at T = 1, anticipation of this policy pre-
vents runs by removing the incentive of type 2 agents to
withdraw early. The following contract is identical to the
pure demand deposit contract described in equations (6)
and (7), except that it states that agents will receive noth-
ing at T = 1 if they attempt to withdraw at T = 1 after a
fraction ˆ f < r1
−1 of all deposits have already been with-







r1 if fj ≤ ˆ f
0i f fj > ˆ f
(9) V2(f, r1) = max{(1−fr1)R/(1−f), (1−ˆ fr1)R/(1−ˆ f)}
where the expression for V2 assumes that 1 − ˆ fr1 >0 .
Convertibility is suspended when fj = ˆ f, and then no
one else in line is allowed to withdraw at T = 1. To dem-
onstrate that this contract can achieve the optimal alloca-
tion, let r1 = c
1
1
*, and choose any ˆ f ∈ {t, [(R−r1)/r1(R−1)]}.
Given this contract, no type 2 agent will withdraw at T =
1 because no matter what the agent anticipates about oth-
ers’ withdrawals, the agent receives higher proceeds by
waiting until T = 2 to withdraw; that is, for all f and fj ≤
f, V2()>V1( ). All of the type 1s will withdraw every-
thing in period 1 because period 2 consumption is worth-
less to them. Therefore, there is a unique Nash equilib-
rium which has f = t. In fact, this is a dominant strategy
equilibrium, because each agent will choose the equilibri-
um action even if it is anticipated that other agents will
choose nonequilibrium or even irrational actions. This
makes this contract very stable. This equilibrium is essen-
tially the good demand deposit equilibrium that achieves
optimal risk-sharing.
A policy of suspension of convertibility at ˆ f guarantees
that it will never be proﬁtable to participate in a bank run
because the liquidation of the bank’s assets is terminated
while type 2s still have an incentive not to withdraw. This
contract works perfectly only in the case where the normal
volumeofwithdrawals,t, isknownandnotstochastic.The
more general case, where t can vary, is analyzed next.
Optimal Contracts With Stochastic Withdrawals
Thesuspension-of-convertibilitycontractachievesoptimal
risk-sharing when t is known ex ante because suspension
never occurs in equilibrium, and the bank can follow the
optimal asset liquidation policy. This is possible because
the bank knows exactly how many withdrawals will occur
when conﬁdence is maintained. We now allow the fraction
of type 1s to be an unobserved random variable, t
~.W e
consider a general class of bank contracts where payments
to those who withdraw at T = 1 are any function of fj and
payments to those who withdraw at T= 2 are any function
of f. Analyzing this general class will show the shortcom-
ings of suspension of convertibility.
Thefull-informationoptimalrisk-sharingisthesameas
before, except that in equations (3)–(5), the actual realiza-
tion of t
~ = t is used in place of the ﬁxed t. Since no single
agent has information crucial to learning the value of t, the
argumentsoffootnote2stillshowthatoptimalrisk-sharing
is consistent with self-selection, so there must be some
mechanismwhichhasoptimalrisk-sharingasaNashequi-
librium.Wenowexplorewhetherbanks(whicharesubject
to the constraint of sequential service) can do this too.
From equations (3)−(5), we obtain full-information op-














*(t)=0 .A tt h eo p -
timum, consumption is equal for all agents of a given type
and depends on the realization of t. This implies a unique
optimal asset liquidation policy given t
~ = t. This turns out
to imply that uninsured bank deposit contracts cannot
achieve optimal risk-sharing.
PROPOSITION 1. Bank contracts (which must obey the
sequential service constraint)cannot achieve optimal risk-
sharing when t is stochastic and has a nondegenerate dis-
tribution.
Proposition 1 holds for all equilibria of uninsured bank
contracts of the general form V1(fj) and V2(f), where
these can be any functions. It obviously remains true that
uninsured pure demand deposit contracts are subject to
runs. Any run equilibrium does not achieve optimal risk-
sharing, because both types of agents receive the same
consumption. Consider the good equilibrium for any fea-sible contract. We prove that no bank contract can attain
the full-information optimal risk-sharing. The proof is
straightforward, a two-part proof by contradiction. Recall
that the place in line fj is uniformly distributed over [0, t]
if only type 1 agents withdraw at T = 1. First, suppose
that the payments to those who withdraw at T =1i sa
nonconstant function of fj over feasible values of t: for
two possible values of t
~,t 1 and t2, the value of a period 1
withdrawal varies; that is, V1(t1) ≠ V1(t2). This immediate-
ly implies that there is a positive probability of different
consumption levels by two type 1 agents who will with-
draw at T = 1, and this contradicts an unconstrained op-
timum. Second, assume the contrary: that for all possible
realizations of t
~ = t, V1(fj) is constant for all fj ∈ [0, t].
This implies that c
1
1(t) is a constant independent of the
realization of t
~, while the budget constraint, equation (5),
shows that c
2






2(t) contradict optimal risk-sharing, equation
(4). Thus, optimal risk-sharingis inconsistent with sequen-
tial service.
Proposition 1 implies that no bank contract, including
suspension of convertibility, can achieve the full-infor-
mation optimum. Nonetheless, suspension can generally
improve on the uninsured demand deposit contract by pre-
venting runs. The main problem occurs when converti-
bility is suspended in equilibrium, that is, when the point
ˆ f where suspension occurs is less than the largest possible
realization of t
~. In that case, some type 1 agents cannot
withdraw, which is inefficient ex post. This can be desir-
able ex ante, however, because the threat of suspension
prevents runs and allows a relatively high value of r1. This
result is consistent with contemporary views about sus-
pension in the United States in the period before deposit
insurance. Although suspensions served to short-circuit
runs, they were “regarded as anything but a satisfactory
solution by those who experienced them, which is why
they produced such strong pressure for monetary and
banking reform” (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, p. 329).
The most important reform that followed was government
deposit insurance. Its impact is analyzed in the next
section.
Government Deposit Insurance
Deposit insurance provided by the government allows
bank contracts that can dominate the best that can be of-
fered without insurance and never do worse. We need to
introduce deposit insurance into the analysis in a way that
keeps the model closed and assures that no aggregate re-
source constraints are violated. Deposit insurance guaran-
tees that the promised return will be paid to all who with-
draw. If this is a guarantee of a real value, the amount that
can be guaranteed is constrained: the government must
impose real taxes to honor a deposit guarantee. If the de-
posit guarantee is nominal, the tax is the (inﬂation) tax on
nominal assets caused by money creation. (Such taxation
occurs even if no inﬂation results; in any case, the price
level is higher than it would have been otherwise, so some
nominally denominated wealth is appropriated.) Because
a private insurance company is constrained by its reserves
in the scale of unconditional guarantees which it can offer,
we argue that deposit insurance probably ought to be gov-
ernmental for this reason. Of course, the deposit guarantee
could be madeby a privateorganization with some author-
ity to tax or create money to pay deposit insurance claims,
although we would usually think of such an organization
as being a branch of government. However, there can be
a small competitive fringe of commercially insured depos-
its, limited by the amount of private collateral.
The government is assumed to be able to levy any tax
that charges every agent in the economy the same amount.
In particular, it can tax those agents who withdrew early in
period T = 1, namely, those with low values of fj. How
much tax must be raised depends on how many deposits
are withdrawn at T = 1 and what amount r1 was promised
to depositors. For example, if every deposit of one dollar
were withdrawn at T = 1 (implying f = 1) and r1 = 2 were
promised, a tax of at least one per capita would need to be
raised because totally liquidating the bank’s assets will
raise at most one per capita at T = 1. As the government
can impose a tax on an agent who has withdrawn, the gov-
ernment can base its tax on f, the realized total value of T =
1 withdrawals. This is in marked contrast to a bank, which
must provide sequential service and cannot reduce the
amount of a withdrawal after it has been made. This asym-
metryallowsapotentialbeneﬁtfromgovernmentinterven-
tion. The realistic sequential service constraint represents
some services that a bank provides but which we do not
explicitly model. With deposit insurance, we will see that
imposing this constraint does not reduce social welfare.
Agents are concerned with the after-tax value of the
proceedsfromtheirwithdrawalsbecausethatistheamount
that theycan consume. Avery strongresult (whichmay be
too strong) about the optimality of deposit insurance will
illuminate the more general reasons it is desirable. We
argue in the conclusion that deposit insurance and the Fed-
eralReservediscountwindowprovidenearlyidenticalser-
vices in the context of our model, but we conﬁne discus-
sion here to deposit insurance.
PROPOSITION 2. Demand deposit contracts with govern-
ment deposit insurance achieve the unconstrained opti-
mum as a unique Nash equilibrium (in fact, a dominant
strategies equilibrium) if the government imposes an op-
timal tax to ﬁnance the deposit insurance.
Proposition 2 follows from the ability of tax-ﬁnanced















1(t) = 0 from the
optimalrisk-sharingcharacterizedinequations(3)–(5).Let
the government impose a tax on all wealth held at the be-
ginning of period T = 1, which is payable either in goods
or in deposits. Let deposits be accepted for taxes at the
pretax amount of goods which could be obtained if with-
drawn at T = 1. The amount of tax that must be raised at
T = 1 depends on the number of withdrawals then and the
asset liquidation policy. Consider the proportionate tax as









1 ( f )/r1]i f f ≤ t
1 − r
−1
1 if f > t
where t ¯ is the greatest possible realization of t
~.
The after-tax proceeds, per dollar of initial deposit, of a
withdrawal at T = 1 depend on f through the tax payment
and are identical for all fj ≤ f. Denote these after-tax pro-








1 ( f )i f f ≤ t
1i f f > t .
The net payments to those who withdraw at T =1
determine the asset liquidation policy and the after-tax val-
ue of a withdrawal at T = 2. Any tax collected in excess
of that needed to meet withdrawals at T = 1 is plowed
back into the bank (to minimize the fraction of assets liq-
uidated). This implies that the after-tax proceeds, per dol-
lar of initial deposit, of a withdrawal at T = 2, denoted by







R 1 − [c
1
1 ( f )f ] /(1−f )=c
2
2 ( f )i f f ≤ t
R(1−f )/(1−f )= R if f > t .
Notice that ˆ V1(f)<ˆ V2(f) for all f ∈ [0, 1], implying
that no type 2 agents will withdraw at T = 1 no matter
what they expect others to do. For all f ∈ [0, 1], ˆ V1(f)>
0, implying that all type 1 agents will withdraw at T =1 .
Therefore, the unique dominant strategy equilibrium is f =
t, the realization of t
~. Evaluated at a realization t,












and the optimum is achieved.
Proposition 2 highlights the key social beneﬁt of gov-
ernment deposit insurance. This insurance allows the bank
to follow a desirable asset liquidation policy, which can be
separated from the cash-ﬂow constraint imposed directly
by withdrawals. Furthermore, deposit insurance prevents
runs because, for all possible anticipated withdrawal poli-
cies of other agents, participating in a bank run never pays.
As a result, no strategic issues of conﬁdence arise. This is
a general result of many deposit insurance schemes. The
proposition may be too strong, since it allows the govern-
ment to follow an unconstrained tax policy. If a nonopti-
mal tax must be imposed, then when t is stochastic, there
will be some tax distortions and resource costs associated
with government deposit insurance. If a sufficiently per-
verse tax provided the revenues for insurance, social wel-
fare could be higher without the insurance.
Depositinsurancecanbeprovidedcostlesslyinthesim-
pler case where tis nonstochastic, for the same reason that
there need not be a suspension of convertibility in equilib-
rium. The deposit insurance guarantees that type 2 agents
will never participate in a run; without runs, withdrawals
are deterministic, and this feature is never used. In particu-
lar, as long as the government can impose some tax to
ﬁnance the insurance, no matter how distortionary, there
will be no runs and the distorting tax need never be im-
posed. This feature is shared by a model of adoption ex-
ternalities in which a Pareto-inferior equilibrium can be
averted by an insurance policy which is costless in equi-
librium. (See Dybvig and Spatt 1983.) In both models, the
credible promise to provide the insurance means that the
promise will not need to be fulﬁlled. This is in contrast to
privately provided deposit insurance. Because insurance
companies do not have the power of taxation, they must
hold reserves to make their promises credible. This il-
lustrates a reason the government may have a natural
advantage in providing deposit insurance. The role of gov-
ernment policy in our model focuses on providing an in-
stitution to prevent a bad equilibrium rather than a policy
to move an existing equilibrium. Generally, such a policy
need not cause distortion.
Conclusions and Implications
The model serves as a useful framework for analyzing the
economics of banking and associated policy issues. It is
interesting that the problems of runs and the differing ef-
fects of suspension of convertibility and deposit insurance
manifest themselves in a model which does not introduce
currency or risky technology. This demonstrates that many
of the important problems in banking are not necessarily
related to those factors, although a general model will re-
quire their introduction.
We analyze an economy with a single bank. The inter-
pretation is that it represents the ﬁnancial intermediary in-
dustryandthatwithdrawalsrepresentnetwithdrawalsfrom
the system. If many banks were introduced into the model,
then there would be a role for liquidity risk-sharing among
banks, and phenomena such as the federal funds market or
the impact ofbank-speciﬁc risk ondeposit insurance could
be analyzed.
The result that deposit insurance dominates contracts
which the bank alone can enforce shows that there is a
potential beneﬁt from government intervention into bank-
ing markets. In contrast to common tax and subsidy
schemes, the intervention we are recommending provides
an institutional framework under which banks can operate
smoothly, much as enforcement of contracts does more
generally.
The riskless technology used in the model isolates the
rationale for deposit insurance, but in addition it abstracts
from the choice of bank loan portfolio risk. If the risk of
bank portfolios could be selected by a bank manager, un-
observed by outsiders (to some extent), then a moral haz-
ard problem would exist. In this case there is a trade-off
between optimal risk-sharing and proper incentives for
portfolio choice, and introducing deposit insurance can in-
ﬂuence the portfolio choice. The moral hazard problem
has been analyzed in complete market settings where de-
posit insurance is redundant and can provide no social im-
provement. (See Kareken and Wallace 1978 and Dothan
and Williams 1980.) But of course in this case there is no
trade-off. Introducing risky assets and moral hazard would
be an interesting extension of our model. It appears likely
that some form of government deposit insurance could
again be desirable but that it would be accompanied by
some sort of bank regulation. Such bank regulation would
serve a function similar to restrictive covenants in bond
indentures. Interesting but hard to model are questions of
regulator discretion which then arise.
Through its discount window, the Federal Reserve can,
asalenderoflastresort,provideaservicesimilartodepos-
it insurance. The Fed would buy bank assets with (money
creation) tax revenues at T = 1 for prices greater than the
assets’liquidating value. If the taxes and transfers were setto be identical to what is implicit in the optimal deposit
insurance,theeffectwouldbethesame.Theidentityofde-
posit insurance and discount window services occurs be-
cause the technology is riskless.
If the technology is risky, the lender of last resort can
no longer be as credible as deposit insurance. If the lender
of last resort were always required to bail out banks with
liquidity problems, there would be perverse incentives for
banks to take on risk, even if bailouts occurred only when
many banks fail together. For instance, if a bailout is an-
ticipated, all banks have an incentive to take on interest
rateriskbymismatchingmaturitiesofassetsandliabilities,
because banks will all be bailed out together.
If the lender of last resort is not required to bail out
banks unconditionally, a bank run can occur in response to
changes in depositor expectations about the bank’s cred-
itworthiness. A run can even occur in response to expecta-
tions about the general willingness of the lender of last
resort to rescue failing banks, as illustrated by the unfor-
tunate experience of the 1930s when the Federal Reserve
misused its discretion and did not allow much discounting.
In contrast, deposit insurance is a binding commitment
which can be structured to retain punishment of the bank’s
owners, board of directors, and officers in the case of a
failure.
The potential for multiple equilibria when a ﬁrm’s lia-
bilities are more liquid than its assets applies more gen-
erally, not simply to banks. Consider a ﬁrm with illiquid
technology which issues very short-term bonds as a large
part of its capital structure. Suppose one lender expects all
other lenders to refuse to roll over their loans to the ﬁrm.
Then it may be the lender’s best response to refuse to roll
over its loans even if the ﬁrm would be solvent if all loans
were rolled over. Such liquidity crises are similar to bank
runs. The protection from creditors provided by the bank-
ruptcy laws serves a function similar to the suspension of
convertibility. The ﬁrm which is viable but illiquid is guar-
anteedsurvival.Thissuggeststhatthetransformationcould
be carried out directly by ﬁrms rather than by ﬁnancial in-
termediaries. Our focus on intermediaries is supported by
thefactthat banksdirectlyholdasubstantial fractionofthe
short-term debt of corporations. Also, there is frequently a
requirement(orcustom)thataﬁrmissuingshort-termcom-
mercial paper obtain a bank line of credit sufficient to pay
off the issue if it cannot be rolled over. A bank with de-
posit insurance can provide liquidity insurance to a ﬁrm,
which can prevent a liquidity crisis for a ﬁrm with short-
term debt and limit the ﬁrm’s need to use bankruptcy to
stop such crises. This suggests that most of the aggregate
liquidity risk in the U.S. economy is channeled through its
insured ﬁnancial intermediaries, to the extent that lines of
credit represent binding commitments.
We hope that this model will prove to be useful in un-
derstanding issues in banking and corporate ﬁnance.
*This article is reprinted, with permission, from the Journal of Political Economy
(1983, vol. 91, no. 3, pp. 401–19). © 1983 by The University of Chicago. All rights
reserved. The article was edited for publication in the Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis Quarterly Review. The authors are grateful for helpful comments from Milt
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1The aborted runs on Hartford Federal Savings and Loan (Hartford, Conn., Feb-
ruary 1982) and on Abilene National Bank (Abilene, Texas, July 1982) are two recent
examples. The large amounts of uninsured deposits in the recently failed Penn Square
Bank (Oklahoma City, July 1982) and that failure’s repercussions are another symptom
of banks’ current problems.











since u′ > 0 and (∀γ ) −u″(γ)γ/u′(γ) > 1. Because u′( ) is decreasing and the resource






*, the solution to (3)–(5) must have c
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3The self-selection constraints state that no agent envies the treatment by the mar-
ketofotherindistinguishableagents.Inourmodel,agents’utilitiesdependononlytheir
consumption vectors across time, and all have identical endowments. Therefore, the
self-selection constraints are satisﬁed if no agent envies the consumption bundle of any
other agent. This can be shown for optimal risk-sharing using the properties described
after (3)–(5). Because c
1
1
* > 1 and c
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*, type 2 agents do not envy type
1 agents. Because the optimal contract satisﬁes the self-selection constraints, there is
necessarily a contract structure which implements it as a Nash equilibrium—the ordi-
nary demand deposit is a contract which will work. However, the optimal allocation
is not the unique Nash equilibrium under the ordinary demand deposit contract. An-
other inferior equilibrium is what we identify as a bank run. Our model gives a real-
world example of a situation in which the distinction between implementation as a
NashequilibriumandimplementationasauniqueNashequilibriumiscrucial.(Seealso
Dybvig and Jaynes 1980 and Dybvig and Spatt 1983.)
4This assumption rules out a mixed strategy equilibrium that is not economically
meaningful.
5To verify this, substitute f = t and r1 = c
1
1













*, all type 2s prefer to wait until pe-
riod 2, while type 1s withdraw at 1, implying that f = t is an equilibrium.
6The value r1 = 1 is the value which rules out runs and mimics the competitive
market because that is the per unit T = 1 liquidating value of the technology. If that liq-
uidating value were θ < 1, then r1 = θ would have this property. The connection be-
tween runs and liquidity service has nothing directly to do with the zero rate of interest
on deposits.
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